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ABSTRACT 
Ad hoc networks are very helpful in situations when no fixed network 
infrastructure is available. They are especially important in emergency situations such 
as natural disasters and military conflicts. Most developed wireless ad hoc routing 
protocols are designed to discover and maintain an active path from source to 
destination with an assumption that every node is friendly and cooperative. However, 
it is possible that the participating nodes are selfish or malicious. A mechanism to 
evaluate reputation for each node is essential for the reliability and security of routing 
protocol in ad hoc networks. 
We propose a fine-grained reputation system for wireless ad hoc routing 
protocols based on constantly monitored and updated first and second -hand reputation 
information. The nodes in the network monitor their neighbors and obtain first-hand 
information based on the perceived behavior. Second-hand information is obtained by 
sharing first-hand information with nodes’ neighbors. Our system is able to distinguish 
between selfish and malicious nodes and take appropriate actions in either case. We 
employ the moving-window mechanism which enables us to assign more weight to 
more recent observations and adjust responsiveness of our reputation system to 
changes in nodes’ behavior. 
We show that our fine-grained reputation system is able to improve both 
reliability and security of an ad hoc network when compared to a reputation system 
that does not distinguish between selfish and malicious nodes. 
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C h a p t e r  I  
INTRODUCTION 
A wireless ad hoc network is a decentralized wireless local area computer 
network that allows wireless devices to directly communicate with each other. Ad hoc 
devices are part of a network for the duration of a communication session, or as in the 
case of mobile devices, for as long as it is in the range of a network. Ad hoc is a Latin 
phrase meaning “for this purpose” (Traupman 2007). As such, ad hoc computer 
networks can be described as temporary ones. These networks are found to be suitable 
for emergency situations such as natural disasters or military conflicts because of their 
decentralized nature, minimal configuration, and ability to be quickly deployed.  
Ad hoc networks are sometimes referred to as a “self-organized 
communication system” (Buchegger 2008). They are characterized by the absence of 
infrastructure and organized according to the peer-to-peer (P2P) principle (Buchegger 
2008): all the nodes participating in a network have equivalent responsibilities (they 
are all peers). Another type of network, an infrastructure mode wireless network, relies 
on the power of access points to cover a wide communication area and relay data 
between the devices in the network. Conversely, ad hoc networks have no designated 
routers or access points, routing decisions are made depending on current connection 
availability, and all nodes in a network have equal responsibility to forward packets for 
all the other networked nodes (Figure 1.1). The communication range of an ad hoc 
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network depends on the power available in the participating devices. If a device tries to 
send data to another device not within its communication range, the data must be 
forwarded through multiple nodes in order to reach its destination (Rackley 2007). 
 
Figure 1.1: Wireless network in infrastructure mode vs. wireless network in ad hoc 
mode. 
Most wireless ad hoc routing protocols are concerned only with maintaining 
the connectivity among the nodes and assume that participating nodes will cooperate 
and perform their routing duties for other nodes. The sender of the data has no 
influence over what path the data takes on the way to the destination. In the presence 
of non-cooperative nodes, the performance of such an ad hoc network will degrade, 
until the network is ultimately rendered useless. Because of the characteristics 
presented above, self-organized communication systems, including ad-hoc networks, 
Device 
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Device 
Device
Device 
Device 
Device 
Wireless Access 
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(a) Wireless Network in Ad Hoc Mode (b) Wireless Network in Infrastructure 
Mode 
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suffer from several issues: lack of cooperation, malicious attacks, and random failures 
of networked nodes (Buchegger 2008). 
The experiment results presented in (Buchegger 2002a) suggest that a 50-node 
network using the defenseless Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) ad hoc routing protocol 
will lose about 70% of packets when one third of the nodes are misbehaving. 
It is reasonable to expect users of a self-organized communication system to be 
concerned primarily about their own benefit, thus cooperation and fairness cannot be 
guaranteed. Since ad hoc networks are completely dependent on willingness of their 
participants to forward packets for each other, nodes that exhibit selfish behavior and 
do not forward packets for their peers can lead to diminishing quality of service or a 
complete collapse of network connectivity. Selfish behavior can be a consequence of a 
node’s physical properties (loss of battery power), a purposeful attempt to save its own 
resources, or a random failure. 
Wireless networks are inherently less secure than the wired networks because 
the signal (the exchanged packets) is broadcasted in the air allowing anyone to access 
it. Wireless ad hoc networks are especially vulnerable to malicious behavior in which 
nodes inject or misroute packets they are supposed to forward for other nodes. 
Various types of reputation systems have emerged in recent years as an attempt 
to address these problems. The need for the reputation systems is obvious if we 
consider the established security models. In the case of standard wireless networks, it 
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is possible to talk about traditional information security, commonly defined as “the 
preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information (CIA 
model)”(Jøsang 2007) . But the CIA model is not adequate for protection against 
deceitful service providers (Jøsang 2007). Rasmussen & Jansson (Jøsang 2007) first 
described “soft security mechanisms”. The purpose of these mechanisms is to 
stimulate ethical behavior and integrity of members in collaborative environments 
such as ad hoc networks, where the ethical norms are not fixed but are rather 
dynamically defined by its participants. Soft security mechanisms are able to recognize 
and sanction intolerable behavior and reward members who follow the norms.  
Reputation systems are classified as a type of soft security mechanisms (Jøsang 
2007). When applied to ad hoc networks, reputation systems require every node to 
keep track of their peers’ behavior. This information is then used to determine which 
peers should be avoided and which can be cooperated with (Buchegger 2008).  
1.1 Objective of Study 
In this project, we incorporate a fine-grained reputation system into a wireless 
ad hoc network with the aim to protect the network from misbehaving (selfish and 
malicious) nodes.  
The main objectives of this system are to improve connectivity and 
cooperation among the nodes in the network, and to minimize interaction with 
malicious nodes which present a security threat for the entire network. Our system is 
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based on the Dirichlet distribution - a multinomial probability distribution. We show 
the benefits of the granular approach as opposed to the reputation systems based on the 
Binomial distribution.  
1.2 Definitions of Terms 
In a wireless ad hoc network all the participating nodes have equal 
responsibility to forward packets for other nodes in the network, thus each node acts as 
a router for other nodes. All nodes that are one hop away from a selected node A are 
said to be A’s neighbors and compose A’s neighborhood (Figure 1.2). In a network 
with infrastructure, a hop is defined to be “the trip a data packet takes form one router 
to another in the network” (SearchCIO-Midmarket.com 2008). Since in an ad hoc 
network every node is a router, a hop is any intermediate node on the path that a data 
packet takes from its source to its destination. Each node in the fine-grained reputation 
system is responsible for observing how its neighbors are handling the packets they 
need to forward for other nodes. That is, whether they correctly forward, drop, or 
maliciously modify each packet they receive. Reputation information indicates how 
well a node behaves as participant in the ad hoc network, i.e. whether it is correctly 
forwarding packets for other nodes. Trust indicates how well a node behaves as a 
participant in the reputation system, i.e. whether a node accurately reports observations 
it made about its neighbors. 
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Figure 1.2: Neighbors and neighborhood. 
1.3 Characteristics of MAC Layer 
We assume that nodes are capable of bidirectional communication on every 
link. This assumption means that it is possible to send data from node A to node B or 
from node B to node A at any point in time. Many wireless Medium Access Control 
(MAC) layer protocols, including IEEE 802.11, require bidirectional communication 
for reliable transmission. We also assume that network interfaces on the nodes support 
promiscuous mode operation. Promiscuous mode “means that if a node A is within 
range of a node B, it can overhear communications to and from B even if those 
communications do not directly involve A” (Marti 2000).  
 
 
Node A 
Neighbor B
Neighbor C
Node A’s 
Neighborhood 
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1.4 Node Behavior and Classification 
Based on observations about their forwarding behavior, we classify wireless 
nodes into three categories: friendly, selfish, and malicious (Figure 1.3). Different 
from classifying nodes into good and bad categories, as done in reputation systems in 
CONFIDANT (Buchegger 2002a), SORI (Wang 2004b), CORE (Michiardi 2002a), 
and SAFE (Rebahi 2005), our approach allows for more precise categorization and 
finer granularity. 
Correctly 
forward packets 
Drop packets 
received for forwarding 
Misroute or 
inject packets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Classification of nodes based on their behavior. 
Friendly nodes correctly forward packets they receive from other nodes. These 
packets are delivered to the destination with preserved data integrity. Friendly behavior 
is the expected behavior in the ad hoc networks. Selfish nodes drop packets they 
receive for forwarding from other nodes, but they expect the other nodes to forward 
packets that the selfish nodes send. Selfish behavior may be a result of a node’s 
physical properties (loss of battery power, overload with forwarding requests), 
friendly selfish malicious 
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purposeful attempt to save its own resources (battery and computing resources), or a 
random failure. This class of misbehaving nodes lowers reliability of the network. 
Malicious nodes misroute, modify, or inject packets (making them a part of a different 
data transfer). These nodes are primarily interested in attacking and damaging the 
network. Malicious nodes lower security and integrity of the network traffic. 
For various reasons, a node’s behavior can change. For example, if a node 
starts losing its battery power, it may begin to behave selfishly and drop packets. Even 
though this node was previously categorized as friendly, our reputation system will 
react to its recent selfish behavior and reclassify it as selfish. 
1.5 Reputation 
Each node assigns a total reputation value to other nodes in the network. This 
value describes the node’s belief about a neighbor’s behavior, i.e. whether the node 
will behave friendly, selfishly, or maliciously. The total reputation value is evaluated 
from both first-hand and second-hand reputation.  
The first-hand reputation value is based on direct observations in promiscuous 
mode that node A makes about the behavior of node B. We denote it as FA,B. Node A 
observes node B’s behavior over some predefined time interval before it calculates 
FA,B. We call this interval a window. The windows allow us to limit the amount of 
historic information we use when calculating the current first-hand reputation value 
(Figure 1.4). We will later discuss the concept of windows in more detail. 
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Figure 1.4: A simple observation window model. 
The second-hand reputation value is obtained by sharing the first-hand 
reputation value with neighbors. All nodes are required to periodically broadcast their 
first-hand reputation values to their neighborhood. When node A receives a report 
form its neighbor C about node B’s behavior (denoted as FC,B), it will merge the two 
values, the first-hand reputation FA,B and the second-hand reputation FC,B, in order to 
calculate the total reputation value for node B. The total reputation value depends on 
several factors as we describe later. Note that we only allow propagation of first-hand 
reputation. Buchegger et al. explain  that “passing on information received from 
others, as opposed to direct observation turns out to not only offer no gain in reputation 
accuracy or speed, but also to introduce vulnerabilities by creating a spiral of self-
reinforcing information” (Buchegger 2008).  
 
 
Node A Node B 
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1.6 Trust 
The purpose of the trust mechanism is to protect the reputation system from 
incorrect second-hand reputation reports. The trust value indicates how accurately a 
node reports reputation information to other nodes. Each node is required to calculate 
and record trust values for its neighbors when it receives second-hand reputation 
values from them. If node C is reporting to node A about node B, trust reflects node 
A’s opinion about trustworthiness of the report considering that it came from node C. 
Every time a node receives second-hand reputation from another node, it needs to 
decide how to consider this information. Since the node regards its knowledge to be 
the most accurate, it will compare the received information with its own. The new 
information will only be accepted if it fits within a specified acceptable deviation. 
Using such test to evaluate each piece of information is “a more fine-grained and 
adaptive approach than only considering the rater reputation of the node providing the 
reputation information” (Buchegger 2008). Following the example of interaction 
between nodes A and C, every time C’s second-hand reputation passes the deviation 
test on node A, the trust that A has for C’s reports will increase. On the other hand, if 
the second-hand reputation does not pass the test, the trust for C on node A will 
decrease. Finally, when node A merges FA,B and FC,B as previously discussed, node A 
discounts FC,B by a certain amount depending on its distrust in the C’s reports. We will 
later discuss the trust mechanism and related calculations in more detail. 
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1.7 Reputation Evaluation 
As shown in the Figure 1.5, reputation evaluation in our fine-grained reputation 
system includes six steps: (1) Node A calculates first-hand reputation information for 
node B (FA,B) based on its observations of node B’s behavior over some number of 
time intervals (windows); (2) Node A receives second-hand information about node 
B’s behavior from nodes C and D (FC,B and FD,B); (3) Node A performs a deviation test 
for the reports FC,B and FD,B and examines the current trust values for nodes C and D 
(ωAC and ωAD); (4) If the current trust values ωAC and ωAD indicate the nodes are 
trustworthy (the trust threshold test) and if the reports pass the deviation test, the 
reports are accepted. If either of the condition fails, they are discarded; (5) To calculate 
the total reputation for node B, node A merges the first-hand reputation information 
with the accepted second-hand reputation values and incorporates the result with the 
previous total reputation; (6) Based on the outcome of the deviation test, node A 
updates trust values for nodes C and D (ωAC and ωAD). If a report passes the deviation 
test, the trust value is increased. If it fails the test, the trust value is decreased. Later, 
we will describe each of these steps in grater detail. 
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Figure 1.5: Reputation evaluation. 
1.8 Node Misbehavior Models 
We now precisely define the adversaries’ abilities considered by our system. 
We define adversaries as nodes which behave in such way that they are degrading 
security, integrity, or reliability of the ad hoc network. The adversaries are grouped 
according to consistency of misbehavior and whether they are selfish or malicious. We 
assume that malicious nodes inject packets when they are supposed to forward packets 
for other nodes and thus lower security and integrity of the network. Malicious 
behavior is an intentional attempt to hurt the network. We assume that selfish nodes 
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only drop packets they are supposed to forward for other nodes. This class of 
adversaries lowers reliability of the network. We attribute selfish behavior to several 
factors: loss of battery power or overload by forwarding requests, selfish behavior in 
order to save resources, or a random failure of software or hardware on the node. Our 
fine-grained reputation system is able to detect and defend against the following four 
attack models: 
Model 1 - consistent individual malicious nodes: 
A malicious node always injects packets when it is in a selected routing path. Our 
reputation system is able to detect and avoid such nodes. 
Model 2 – occasional individual malicious nodes:  
A malicious node occasionally injects packets when it is in a selected routing path. 
The moving window mechanism allows us to adjust the responsiveness of the fine-
grained reputation system to changes in nodes’ behavior. If the window size is small, 
the system will quickly recognize any occasional changes in behavior.  
Model 3 – consistent individual selfish nodes:  
A selfish node always drops packets when it is in a selected routing path. Our system 
is able to recognize and avoid such nodes.  
Model 4 – occasional individual selfish nodes:  
A selfish node occasionally drops packets when it is in a selected routing path. This 
model is handled in the same manner as Model 2.  
While this work does not focus on the function and effectiveness of the trust 
system, it is important to mention that the trust system enables the fine-grained 
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reputation system to also recognize and avoid nodes that falsely report reputation 
values of other nodes (lying nodes). Propagation of false low reputation values will 
result in low reputation values for good nodes. This may lead to a denial of service 
attack, where the falsely accused nodes are punished and denied network services, 
while at the same time the entire network suffers from decreased connectivity since the 
falsely accused nodes will be avoided in routing paths. If false high reputation is 
propagated, the network may utilize malicious and selfish nodes and both security and 
reliability are going to decrease.  Using the trust deviation test, the nodes are able to 
calculate the difference d between the reported and the current reputation value and 
decide how to consider the reported value. Mundinger et al. show that for a small d, 
the system will be more robust against lying nodes. However, “smaller d means less 
use of second-hand information”(Mundinger 2005), and the reputation system may 
take longer to converge to the true reputation value. Thus the trust system requires 
consideration of a tradeoff between speed and accuracy of the reputation system. 
1.9 Performance Metrics 
In order to evaluate the performance of our model, we consider the following 
metrics: effective throughput, connectivity, and the percentage of injected or modified 
packets introduced in the system by malicious nodes. 
Effective throughput is a measurement of the effective aggregate bandwidth of 
our system. It is the ratio of the bandwidth occupied by the legitimate (not modified or 
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injected) packets that reached their destination and the bandwidth carrying all the 
packets that reached their destination. We express this mathematically as: 
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where ETN is the effective throughput for a network during some defined time interval, 
and PR, PI and PS are, respectively, the total number of received, injected, and sent 
packets during this time interval. 
We define connectivity as a function of the number and a cost of possible paths 
in the network connecting all available nodes capable of forwarding packets. We 
calculate connectivity according to the following formula: 
∑ ∑= == nA nB
AB
N S
C
0 0
1 , 
where CN is the total connectivity of a network at some point in time, n is the number 
of nodes in the network, and SAB is the reputation cost of reaching node B from node A 
as observed on node A and given that A and B are neighbors. If node A and B are not 
neighbors, then the connectivity between them is zero. Decreased connectivity among 
nodes may lead to partitioning of the network, a scenario in which two nodes engaged 
in a communication session suddenly become physically unreachable from each other 
because no nodes are capable of forwarding packets between them. Our goal is to 
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obtain higher connectivity than the reputation systems that classify nodes only as good 
and malicious and react to the misbehavior by disconnecting the misbehaving nodes 
from the network. 
Finally, the percentage of injected or modified packets indicates how often 
malicious nodes receive an opportunity to forward data packets for other nodes. The 
fine-grained reputation system distinguishes malicious from selfish behavior and 
avoids malicious nodes when making routing decisions. Our goal is to decrease the 
number of injected or modified packets present in the system when compared to the 
reputation system that classifies nodes as good and bad. 
 17 
C h a p t e r  I I  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Securing ad hoc routing protocols against selfish and malicious nodes has been 
the subject of intense research efforts over the past few years. Here, we will present 
several solutions for encouraging node cooperation. The general idea behind these 
solutions is that all nodes keep track of behavior of their peers and use these 
observations to calculate a reputation value for each individual peer. This reputation 
value acts as an estimate of the quality with which each peer performs its networking 
functions. When making routing decisions, nodes will avoid peers with low reputation 
values. The goal of the reputation system is to ensure quality of network services by 
either encouraging or forcing all nodes to maintain high reputation values. Wang et al. 
(Wang 2004b) classify reputation systems that use incentives to encourage cooperation 
are classified as motivation based. On the contrary, detection based reputation systems 
exclude misbehaving nodes from the network soon as their reputation falls below some 
threshold. Regardless of the strategy taken against misbehaving nodes, all reputation 
systems should be fully decentralized and scalable in order to fit the ad hoc 
architecture. 
Mahmoud et al. in (Mahmoud 2005) propose a solution, Reputed-ARAN 
protocol, in which each node promiscuously monitors its first neighbors and makes 
routing decisions based solely on its experiences with them. As pointed out by 
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Laniepce et al. in (Laniepce 2006), there are a number of situations in which 
promiscuous mode monitoring can fail. For instance, node A may not be able to 
correctly observe node B forwarding a packet if A receives a packet form another node 
outside of B’s receiving zone. This scenario results in a packet collision (Laniepce 
2006). Additionally, nodes using Reputed-ARAN described in (Mahmoud 2005) have 
a very limited localized view of the network and are not be able to make informed 
routing decisions. More advanced reputation systems propose gathering as much 
information as possible before evaluating behavior of a node. Nodes in such systems 
periodically exchange information they collect about their neighbors with other nodes 
in the network. Such systems are described in (Buchegger 2002a), (Wang 2004b), 
(Haghpanah 2007), (Michiardi 2002a), and (Rebahi 2005). 
Reputation systems that include exchange of collected reputation information 
among the nodes are referred to as collaborative. These systems provide a better view 
of nodes’ networking function and enable participants to make better routing 
decisions. However they all suffer from a common pitfall – the reputation information 
becomes incorrect in presence of lying nodes. The lying nodes will maliciously spread 
false information, reporting that a good node misbehaves or that a malicious node 
behaves correctly. Several approaches have been taken to counter the lying nodes and 
their collusions.  
The mechanism that extends the reputation system and tracks nodes’ behavior 
as participants in the reputation system is referred to as a trust mechanism (Jøsang 
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2007). For instance, in (Buchegger 2002a), which describes the mechanics of the 
CONFIDANT ad hoc routing protocol, Buchegger et al. discuss a trust system that is 
similar to Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) trust, which allows for several trust levels. PGP 
uses public key cryptography in which each user has a pair of cryptographic keys: a 
public and a private key. The public key may be widely distributed, while the private 
key is kept secret. Messages transmitted between a sender and a recipient are 
encrypted with the recipient’s public key and can only be decrypted with his 
corresponding private key. Thus it is important that the public key which the sender 
uses to send a message actually belongs to the intended recipient. A public key may be 
digitally signed by a third party to attest to the association between the user and the 
key. In order to calculate the validity of a public key, PGP examines the trust levels of 
attached certifying signatures. Then it proceeds to calculate a weighted validity score. 
This means that two or more signatures with lower trust level may be considered as 
good as one with a high trust level. In the ad hoc network described in (Buchegger 
2002a), the nodes are required to establish and maintain a list of friends to which they 
send reports, but the mechanics of this list are not discussed in detail. CONFIDANT 
only allows spread of negative experience in order to prevent nodes form falsely 
reporting malicious behavior as good. Since propagation of positive experience is not 
allowed, the redemption process in case a node improves its behavior is slow. 
In contrast, ad hoc routing protocol CORE (Michiardi 2002a) only allows 
dissemination of positive experience in order to prevent lying nodes to distribute false 
accusations. This system is thus slow to react to misbehaving nodes. Despite this 
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limitation, (Michiardi 2002b) shows that, under the right circumstances, CORE is still 
able to ensure cooperation of at least half of the nodes in the network 
A secure ad hoc routing protocol SORI presented in (Wang 2004b) does not 
include any special safeguards for chronically lying nodes. Haghpanah et al. in 
(Haghpanah 2007) recognize this problem and introduce a trust mechanism in order to 
make SORI immune to lying nodes. In addition to keeping track of the reputation 
values, nodes also keep track of trust values for its neighbors. Whenever a node 
receives a reputation report from another node, it compares the new report to its own 
record of observations. If the reported behavior is different from the observed 
behavior, the trust for the reporting node (that issued the report) will decrease. The 
trust value of a reporting node directly influences the effect that the reported 
information will have on the current reputation values on the node which received the 
report. Results presented in (Haghpanah 2007) show that this mechanism improves 
performance of SORI in presence of lying nodes. However, because trust values also 
need to be tracked, this expansion of  the ad hoc routing protocol SORI doubles 
storage requirements for each reputation record or each node. 
The ad hoc routing protocol solution SAFE discussed in (Rebahi 2005) does 
not employ a separate trust system, but rather uses reputation values as an indication of 
nodes’ honesty. This is not an adequate solution, however, since reputation values do 
not indicate how well the node is performing as a participant in the reputation system. 
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Motivation based reputation systems offer incentives to nodes in order to 
stimulate their cooperation. This method does not involve active monitoring of the 
network, but only works to encourage packet forwarding. A motivation based solution 
presented in (Buttyan 2001) involves introduction of a virtual currency called nuglets. 
Nuglets are used in every transaction. There are two different models that involve the 
use of nuglets: the Packet Purse Model and the Packet Trade Model. In Packet Purse 
model the node is responsible for including a certain amount of nuglets in a packet it 
wants to send. Each forwarding node will then take out nuglets as a compensation for 
its forwarding service. This model discourages users from flooding the network with 
their packets, but the source node needs to know exactly how many nuglets it needs to 
include in the packet. It needs to be noted that there is no mechanism to prevent 
forwarding nodes from taking out more nuglets than they should (Michiardi 2002a). In 
the Packet Trade Model, each intermediate node pays with nuglets for the packet from 
a previous node in the path, thus ultimately making the destination paying for the 
packet delivery. This system does not prevent malicious flooding of the network. 
Additionally, the intermediate nodes could potentially take the payment and drop the 
packet (Michiardi 2002a). 
Wang et al. in (Wang 2004a) propose a scheme where all nodes on a path 
receive the maximum possible amount for their forwarding service so they do not 
benefit from cheating. However, the paper does not discuss how the payments are 
made. Wang et al. assume that all nodes will truthfully reveal their cost, but they note 
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that this system may fail in case where a group of nodes attempts to maximize their 
total payments by circular routing. 
Buttyan et al. in (Buttyan 2002) suggest implementation of nuglet counters 
which are increased for forwarding services and decreased for sending. The nodes are 
only able to send packets while their nuglet counters are positive. As Buttyan et al. 
discuss, this scheme requires a special tamper proof hardware to disallow a node to 
increase its nuglet counters illegitimately. Jakobsson et al. in (Jakobsson 2003) note 
that a node’s ability to accumulate nuglets in this scheme will depend on its position in 
the network; the nodes positioned in the center will have more chances to perform 
routing and earn nuglets that the nodes near the edges. Additionally, Jakobsson et al. 
(Jakobsson 2003) require the presence of base stations and an accounting center in 
order to insure the correct operation of the incentive system. Base stations and an 
accounting center are not available in ad hoc networks. 
In general, all payment methods require that the payer, in addition to cost, is 
able to recognize the payee using some form of identity which is not easily established 
in ad hoc networks. If a method for tracking the identity of payees does not exist, the 
payer can attach some amount of currency which is to be taken by, to him, unknown 
payees. In this case, there needs to be an audit system that will track the payments to 
prevent potential abuse (Jakobsson 2003). Thusly, an incentive method alone without a 
monitoring component is not sufficient to ensure cooperation in ad hoc networks. 
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Detection based reputation systems such as those implemented in (Buchegger 
2002a), (Wang 2004b), (Rebahi 2005), and (Michiardi 2002a) do not offer incentives 
but threaten to exclude misbehaving nodes from the network when their reputation 
falls below some threshold. Excluded nodes are not allowed to either send or forward 
packets. CONFIDANT protocol allows nodes to rejoin the network after a timeout. 
This feature may result in a potential vulnerability, as malicious nodes can repeat their 
malicious behavior after they rejoin. In order to counter this vulnerability, SAFE 
assigns a critical reputation value to readmitted nodes. In case they continue to behave 
maliciously, they are excluded again after a shorter time period. However, this 
mechanism requires keeping track of nodes identities indefinitely after they leave the 
network. In addition, the solution proposing exclusion of all misbehaving nodes leads 
to a lower global connectivity of the network and reduces its functionality. 
It is to be expected that the behavior of a node will change over time, either for 
better or for worse. For example, as a node is using up its battery power, it is possible 
that it will start behaving selfishly and drop packets it is supposed to forward for its 
peers. In order to account for these changes, reputation systems need to track history of 
nodes’ behavior. This historic behavior is, in some fashion, included in the calculation 
of node’s total reputation score. In ad hoc routing protocol SAFE (Rebahi 2005),  more 
weight is assigned to the more recent observations. In CORE (Michiardi 2002a), more 
weight is given to previous observations than to more recent ones in order to avoid 
decreasing a node’s reputation score in case of sporadic, unintentional selfish behavior. 
However, if previous observations are given more weight, it is possible for 
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misbehaving nodes to build up good reputation and “become bottlenecks with 
impunity” (Laniepce 2006). 
Finally, we will discuss several different solutions employed for calculating 
reputation values upon which nodes in an ad hoc network make routing decisions.  
As discussed previously, the reputation system Reputed-ARAN  described in 
(Mahmoud 2005) is not a collaborative reputation system, thus the reputation 
information is not shared among the nodes. Each node will only track reputation 
values for its neighbors. The initial reputation value is always 0. For each observed 
correctly-forwarded-packet, a node is awarded +1 reputation point, while for each 
dropped packet the node is punished by -2 reputation points. Once the reputation 
counter for a particular node reaches -40, the node will be excluded from the network. 
It is allowed to rejoin after 5 minutes and its reputation is reset to 0. This very simple 
approach may potentially allow nodes to accumulate reputation points and misbehave 
sporadically, keeping their reputation value above -40.  
SORI (Wang 2004b) uses a ratio of correctly forwarded to correctly received 
(to be forwarded) packets. In addition to reputation values, SORI tracks a value 
describing the confidence that the current reputation value is true. The confidence 
value is essentially a measure of the frequency with which a node attempted to route a 
packet through a particular peer with the same outcome. This solution obviously 
requires a more complex implementation and more data storage for reputation-related 
values. 
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In CONFINDANT (Buchegger 2002a), the reputation system only reacts to 
negative experiences. In presence of sufficient evidence of malicious behavior, the 
node’s reputation rating is changed “according to a rate function that assigns different 
weights to the type of behavior detection, namely the greatest weight for own 
experience, a smaller weight for observations in the neighborhood, and an even 
smaller weight for reported experience” (Buchegger 2002a). Since the negative 
reputation values never decrease, the only way for a node to regain its reputation is by 
either waiting for a time out, when the black list of misbehaving nodes cleared, or by 
being removed from the black list if it exhibits the correct behavior for a certain 
amount of time. However, Buchegger et al. do not specify what the time interval is.  
In contrast to CONFIDANT, CORE (Michiardi 2002a) reputation system 
reacts to both positive and negative experiences. However, only positive experiences 
are exchanged among the nodes. The reputation value nodes use to make routing 
decision is a combination of the locally observed behavior and the indirect reputation 
(i.e. observations neighbor nodes made and reported). The local reputation value is a 
value between -1 and 1, where 0 represents neutral reputation. It is calculated as a 
weighted mean of the observation’s rating factors, giving more weight to the past 
experiences. Nodes are rated with -1 for a negative impression, and +1 for a positive 
impression. When local and indirect reputations are combined, the weight of indirect 
reputation depends on the trustworthiness of the reporting node. Nodes with a negative 
reputation value are excluded from the network. 
 26 
Similarly to SORI, SAFE (Rebahi 2005) calculates reputation as a ratio of 
dropped to forwarded packets. More recent observations are given greater weight. 
Reputation values vary from 0 to 1. As mentioned previously, SAFE does not employ 
a separate trust system, but uses reputation values as trust values. Thus reports from 
nodes that have better reputation will have greater weight than the reports form the 
nodes with lesser reputation. Disconnected misbehaving nodes are allowed to rejoin 
the network after a certain time interval, but they are assigned a critical reputation 
value, lower than the neutral reputation. In case these nodes do not improve their 
behavior, they are excluded again after a shorter time interval.  
Marti et al. in (Marti 2000), propose a mechanism where reputation value is 
periodically increased for all nodes actively used in routing paths. If a link breaks, and 
a node does not perform the routing function, the reputation rating is decreased by 
0.05. In (Marti 2000) exchange of both positive and negative reputation ratings is 
allowed, but the exact mechanism of merging local and reported reputation is not 
discussed.  
The reputation systems that use incentives to encourage cooperation among 
nodes, such as (Buttyan 2001), (Wang 2004a), (Jakobsson 2003), and (Buttyan 2002) 
rely on currency balance to reflect a current reputation value of a node. 
Buchegger et al. state that, “the ratio of good to bad behavior reflects the 
willingness to cooperate only in relation to a specific extent of demand or opportunity 
for cooperation. This extent is lost in the ratio and therefore unknown” (Buchegger 
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2008). This limits the explanatory power of the cooperation ratio. Nodes that are 
positioned in such a way where they receive greater number of requests for forwarding 
will have a better opportunity to establish good reputation even if they do not correctly 
process all of the requests. Furthermore, Buchegger et al. note that “if the absolute 
number of cooperation instances is taken as the basis for reputation calculation, it is 
not known what the number of opportunities was out of which the behavior was good 
or bad” (Buchegger 2008). We believe that our proposed system, as we describe it in 
the next chapter of this project, contains a solid statistical basis to capture “willingness 
to cooperate in relation to opportunity”(Buchegger 2008). 
In conclusion, we observe that all the discussed schemes group nodes in two 
categories – good and misbehaving, where misbehaving nodes include both malicious 
and selfish nodes. We consider malicious nodes more costly in network operations, 
and thus agree that they should be excluded from the networking function (i.e. not 
allowed to send packets or trusted to route packets for other nodes). However, selfish 
nodes should not be excluded from the network, but given an incentive to improve 
their cooperation. This calls for an ability to distinguish between selfish and malicious 
nodes. Our system is able to make this distinction.  
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C h a p t e r  I I I  
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Fine-Grained Reputation System 
Our fine-grained reputation system is designed to improve reliability and 
security in wireless ad hoc networks. The main objectives of our system are to improve 
connectivity and cooperation among wireless ad hoc nodes while reducing interaction 
with malicious nodes.  
In a fine-grained reputation system, each node stores reputation information for 
other nodes in the network. This reputation information indicates how well the node 
behaves as a participant in the wireless ad hoc network. Based on the reputation of the 
intermediate nodes, nodes in an ad hoc network are able to select the most reliable and 
secure path from the data source to the destination. Reputation information indicating 
that a particular node behaves inadequately will trigger a response from the rest of the 
network resulting in disadvantages or a punishment for the misbehaving node. The 
reputation system allows for a different response depending on the severity of the 
node’s bad behavior. This feature is an advantage in comparison to the reputation 
systems which classify nodes in only two categories - good and bad. 
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3.1.1 First-hand reputation 
Each node in the fine-grained reputation system is responsible for observing 
the forwarding behavior of its neighbors using the promiscuous mode on its network 
interface.  
For example, node A observes the number of correctly forwarded, dropped, or 
maliciously modified packets from its neighbor, node B. Based on outcomes drawn 
independently from these observations, node A assumes that the behavior of node B 
follows a probability of FA,B. This probability varies for each packet A observes on 
node B. Since the parameters FA,B are unknown, we model this uncertainty by 
assuming that FA,B is drawn from a distribution (the prior) and updated when new 
observations are available. If the likelihood of a node’s behavior is binomial, i.e. the 
behavior can be good or bad and it occurs independently, a good prior distribution is 
the Beta distribution (Buchegger 2003). Since we want to account for more than just 
two independent variables (types of behavior), we use the multivariate generalization 
of the Beta distribution – the Dirichlet distribution.  
Bayes’ theorem allows us to compute the posterior probability when new 
observations and prior knowledge are available. Expressed in mathematical terms, 
Bayes’ theorem has the form:  
)(
)()|()|(
BP
APABPBAP = . 
P(A|B) is the conditional probability of event A being observed given the probability 
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of event B. This factor is also called posterior probability because it is derived from the 
specific value of B. P(B|A) is a conditional probability of event B given A. P(A) is the 
prior probability of event A, in the sense that it does not depend on the information 
about B. P(B) is the prior probability of B, and it acts as a normalizing constant 
(Bolstad 2007). In probability theory, a normalizing constant is used to multiply a 
nonnegative function in order to make it a probability density function (in order that 
the area under its graph is 1) (Feller 1968). The probabilities of random events are 
assigned according to the frequencies of their occurrence in random sampling. 
We assume that FA,B follows the Dirichlet distribution. The Dirichlet 
distribution is denoted as Dir(α), where α is a vector of positive real numbers. α1,…,αn 
are the shape parameters for the probability density function (pdf) of the Dirichlet 
distribution. Informally, a pdf is a smoothed out version of histogram: “if one 
empirically samples enough values of a continuous random variable, producing a 
histogram depicting relative frequencies of output ranges, then this histogram will 
resemble the random variable’s probability density, assuming that the output ranges 
are sufficiently narrow” (Mendenhall 2008).  
We use the Dirichlet distribution because it is a conjugate prior to the 
multinomial distribution.  A multinomial probability distribution describes the 
probability that each independent trial result is exactly one of some fixed finite number 
n of possible outcomes with probabilities p1,…,pn  and as such is a natural choice in 
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our solution (Fink 1997). The set of parameters for the ith attribute model of the 
Dirichlet distribution riii 1}{ == αα  corresponds to a multinomial distribution.  
In Bayesian probability, a class of prior probability distributions P(θ) is said to 
be conjugate to a class of probability functions P(x|θ) if the resulting posterior 
distributions P(θ|x) are in the same family as P(θ) (Raiffa 1961). When a conjugate 
prior is multiplied with the likelihood function, it results in a posterior probability that 
has the same functional form as the prior, allowing the posterior to be used as a prior in 
further computations.  
Thus, under the assumption that the prior pdf fk-1(r) follows a Dirichlet 
distribution, the posterior pdf fk(r) also follows a Dirichlet distribution. Given the 
Dirichlet prior ),...,|()( 1 iriii XDirXP αα= , where αiz are positive constants, the 
posterior distribution of iθ can be computed using the Bayes’ theorem as  
),...,|(
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Starting with the initial state as the prior distribution, the parameters can be 
updated when new data D is available. Variable N describes instances of new data. We 
define the reputation value based on the first-hand observations assigned to a node at a 
time t to be equal to the expectation value of the Dir(α).  
For clarity, we now show through an example how this approach works. In 
Table 3.1 we illustrate how node A updates the reputation value of its neighbor, node 
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B. Observations about packets forwarded by node B are made in equal time intervals 
or windows. We will discuss the concept of a window in more detail later in this 
chapter. In this example, each window contains a constant number of 50 packets. This 
is equivalent to an assumption that node B processes (forwards) 50 packets per time 
interval. Given that we are observing three possible events: friendly, selfish, or 
malicious behavior, α1, α2, α3 are the shape parameters for the Dirichlet probability 
density function and they indicate whether the node B is friendly, selfish, or malicious. 
Let observations of correctly forwarded, dropped, or maliciously modified packets be 
X = (X1, …, Xk) ~ Dir(α) and ∑
=
=
K
i
i
1
0 αα , where K = 3, then the expectation value of 
the distribution is the vector (x1,…,xk) where 
0α
α i
ix = . Parameter K is equal to the 
number of shape parameters in Dir(α). Since we are observing three independent 
events, K = 3 in our case. 
Initially, A has no knowledge about B’s behavior. We choose an optimistic 
approach and classify B as friendly. The shape parameters α1, α2 and α3 are thus 
<1,0,0>.  Regardless of the initial shape parameters, as new information is collected, 
α1, α2 and α3 will converge to approximate the node’s true behavior. Note that the sum 
of the expectation values x1+x2+x3 has to be equal to one. Each time node A collects 
new data, the parameters α1, α2 and α3 are updated. In the first window, 50 packets are 
observed. Node B correctly forwards 40 (N1) packets, drops 10 (N2), and does not 
inject any packets (N3). The parameters are thus updated as α1=α1+N1, α2=α2+N2 and 
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α3=α3+N3. The node A calculates the reputation value for its neighbor node B after it 
observed 5 windows as the expectation value of Dir(α). 
Table 3.1: Reputation calculation based on the observations node A makes about its 
neighbor, node B. 
Window Number of observed 
packets 
α1 α2 α3 
1 50 40 10 0 
2 50 30 15 5 
3 50 40 5 5 
4 50 35 10 5 
5 50 40 10 0 
Total number of 
observed packets 
in windows 0-5 
250 185 50 15 
Expectation value 
of Xi 
--- (185)/ (250) = 
0.74 
(50)/(250) =  
0.2 
(15)/(250) = 
0.06 
 
3.1.2 Second-Hand Reputation 
As Laniepce et al. point out, the promiscuous mode used by nodes to collect 
information about their neighbors’ behavior may fail in certain cases (Laniepce 2006). 
More specifically, node A will not be able to correctly observe node B forwarding a 
packet if A receives a packet form another node outside of the B’s receiving zone. As 
described in (Laniepce 2006), this scenario results in collision (Figure 3.1). Generally, 
a packet collision occurs when two or more devices in a network attempt to send 
packets over the network at the same time.  
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Figure 3.1: Node A is not able to can not overhear node B forwarding P1 to D because 
P1 collides with P2 sent by node C (Laniepce 2006). 
In addition, if the nodes only relied on their own observations, they would have 
a localized view of the network and would not be able to make informed routing 
decisions. Because of these limitations, nodes in the fine-grained reputation system 
gather as much information as they can before making a decision about their 
neighbor’s behavior. We employ collaborative monitoring to allow nodes to exchange 
observations with each other. However, we only allow nodes to propagate their first-
hand observations and not the information they received from other nodes. Buchegger 
et al. state that passing information other than first-hand observations does not offer 
any gain in reputation accuracy or speed, but in fact introduces vulnerabilities by 
creating a “spiral of self-reinforcing information” (Buchegger 2008). They suggest a 
Node A Node B Node C Node D 
P1 
P1 
P2 
Collision 
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theoretical analysis in which they find that spreading only the first-hand reputation is 
more robust against nodes who report inaccurate reputation information. 
In our fine-grained reputation system, nodes are required to periodically 
broadcast first-hand reputation values they collected into their neighborhood, so that 
other nodes can incorporate this knowledge into their total reputation values. We refer 
to these reports as second-hand reputation. 
In order to detect and avoid false reports, nodes use a deviation test on all 
reports they receive. Based on the test, nodes decide whether to increase or decrease 
the trust in the reporter’s accuracy, and ultimately whether or not to incorporate the 
report into their total reputation value. The formula for the deviation test we use is:  
dDirEDirE CBAB ≤− |)),,(()),,((| 321321 αααβββ ,  
where the first term is the second-hand reputation, the second term is the current 
reputation value the node has, and d is a positive constant as the threshold. We allow 
30% deviation, however we do not try to optimize this threshold. A very detailed 
analysis of the deviation test is available in (Mundinger 2005). 
3.1.3 Trust 
Each node in the fine-grained reputation system, in addition to reputation 
information, stores trust information for its neighbors. Trust indicates how trustworthy 
the neighbor’s reports are. We can also say that trust value indicates a node’s behavior 
as an actor in the reputation system. Our trust system uses a similar Bayesian approach 
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used in the fine-grained reputation system. The difference is that trust is expressed 
through only two possible instances of behavior: trustworthy and not trustworthy (as 
opposed to the reputation, where a node can behave friendly, selfishly, or maliciously). 
Because of this, we choose to use the Beta distribution as a prior. The Beta distribution 
is in fact a case of the Dirichlet distribution with only two probability density function 
shape parameters. The Beta distribution is conjugate, which means that a posterior 
probability will have the same functional form as the prior. Therefore, after updating, 
the trust value still follows the Beta distribution.  
We denote the trust which node A has for node B as TAB ~ Beta(γ, δ), where γ 
stands for trustworthy reports and δ for not trustworthy. Initially, γ = δ = 1, which 
corresponds to uniform distribution and indicates absence of knowledge. Trust is 
updated when results of the deviation test are available. If the deviation test holds, the 
trust for the reporting node is increased by increasing γ = γ + 1. If the deviation test 
does not hold, the trust is decreased by increasing δ = δ + 1. Each time new deviation 
test results are available, trust parameters are updated. 
Trust value for node B on node A is calculated as the expectation value of 
Beta(γ, δ) as δγ
γδγω +== )),((BetaEAB .  
Table 3.2 illustrates changes in TAB as node A receives second-hand reputation 
reports from node B. We can see how the ωAB decreases as the number of instances of 
reports that do not pass the deviation test (δ) increases. 
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Table 3.2: Trust calculation for node B based on the deviation tests on node A as it 
receives second-hand reputation information from node B. 
Time Deviation 
test passed? 
Trustworthy 
γ 
Not 
trustworthy 
Δ δγ
γδγω +== )),((BetaEAB
0 -- 1 1 0.5 
1st Yes 2 1 0.667 
2nd Yes 3 1 0.75 
3rd No 3 2 0.6  
4th No 3 3 0.5 
5th No 3 4 0.429 
 
A node’s decision to accept or deny a second-hand report is based on the trust 
value threshold. Without attempting to optimize this threshold, we decided to consider 
all nodes that have ω≥ 0.5 sufficiently trustworthy. Second-hand reputation from these 
nodes is thusly incorporated into total reputation values when it passes the deviation 
test. Since ωAB describes the amount of trust the node has in the truthfulness of the 
report, we use value ωAB as a discounting factor during the reputation merging process. 
We discuss this process next.  
3.1.4 Total Reputation Based on First and Second-Hand Reputation 
In order to establish the total reputation value for neighbor C, node A merges 
its own observations (first-hand reputation) with observations reported by other nodes 
(for example, node B). We refer to this value as total reputation value, and denote it as 
RAC. Every node believes that its prior knowledge about the behavior of its neighbor, 
node B, is the most accurate. Thus, first-hand reputation information is merged as-is, 
while second-hand information is discounted by the factor ωAC expressing the disbelief 
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in the accuracy of the report. The maximum value for trust is 1, corresponding to an 
undeniable fact. 
The total reputation value node A calculates for node B, given second-hand 
reputation reported by node C is calculated as: 
CBACABAB FFR ω+= ,  
where FAB is the first-hand reputation, FCB is the second hand reputation, and ωAC is 
the trust node A has for node C’s reports. 
Let us now use an example in order to illustrate total reputation value 
calculation and trust value update performed by our fine-grained reputation system. 
Suppose that node A is calculating the total reputation value for node B. Upon 
receiving a second-hand reputation FCB from node C, node A performs the deviation 
test: |FCB – FAB|≤ d. Next, node A examines the current trust value for node C, ωAC. 
ωAC is calculated as the expectation value of Beta(γ, δ), where γ is the trustworthy 
parameter, and δ is the not trustworthy parameter. If the report passes the deviation test 
and if ωAC value is above the trust threshold, FCB is incorporated into total reputation 
value. If the report does not pass the deviation test or ωAC is not above the threshold, 
FCB report is discarded. In either case, if FCB passed the deviation test, the trust 
parameter γ is increased as γ = γ + 1, and thus the overall trust ωAC is increased. If FCB 
does not pass the deviation test, the trust parameter δ is increased as δ = δ + 1. As the 
consequence, the overall trust ωAC is decreased.  
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Assuming that FCB passed the deviation test and that ωAC is above the 
threshold, the total reputation is calculated as CBACABAB FFR ω+= , where we discount 
FCB by the factor ωAC. The term ωAC is the trust value for node C on node A, and we 
use it here to account for node A’s suspicion about C’s honesty. 
3.1.5 Moving Window Mechanism 
As previously noted, nodes in the fine-grained reputation system observe their 
neighbors over equal time intervals or windows. Let us now discuss the details and the 
role that the window mechanism has in the reputation system. 
In general, there are two alternative ways to update first-hand reputation. One 
is to update based on all observations, the other is to update based only on the most 
recent observations. We choose to consider the passing of time in our reputation 
system and update based on the most recent observation for the following reasons: it 
reduces computation complexity, it makes possible to early detect changes in subjects 
behavior, and it provides the possibility of redemption over time for a node that has 
been repaired. The moving window mechanism allows us to divide historic 
information into time intervals of equal size and consider only a limited number of 
these intervals for the calculation of first-hand reputation.  
Table 3.3: illustrates a case in which node A is observing node B which was 
behaving friendly during the first 3 windows, but then became malicious. 
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Table 3.3: Illustration of early detection by moving window mechanism. 
Window Number of observed 
packets 
α1 α2 α3 
1 50 50 0 0 
2 50 50 0 0 
3 50 40 0 10 
4 50 40 0 10 
5 50 40 0 10 
Windows 0-5 
Total number of 
observed packets 
in windows 0-5 
250 220 0 30 
Expectation value 
of Xi  
--- (220)/(250)= 
 0.88 
(0)/(250) = 
0 
(30)/(250)= 
0.12 
Windows 3-5 
Total number of 
observed packets 
in windows 3-5 
150 120 0 30 
Expectation value 
of Xi  
--- (120)/(150)= 
0.8 
(0)/(150)= 
0 
(30)/(150)= 
0.2 
 
From Table 3.3 we see that if the size of our moving window is five, the first-
hand reputation is F1AB = < 0.88, 0, 0.12>. If the size is three, only the three most 
recent observations are considered and the first-hand reputation is F2AB = < 0.8, 0, 
0.2>. We see that F2 better reflects the change of behavior in node B, as the malicious 
component of F2 is higher than in F1.  
However, we must not forget that a wireless network is prone to errors in 
packet content and occasional packet dropping due to interference or other wireless-
medium-related causes. If we use a small moving window, the reputation system will 
be extremely responsive to even minor changes in nodes behavior. In the case of a 
wireless network, this may be undesirable. The reputation system could overreact and 
label a node as misbehaving only because of medium-related issues. If we choose a 
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larger moving window, reputation will not oscillate due to occasional errors, but the 
system may not be able to immediately detect changes in node’s behavior. We did not 
attempt to optimize the size of the moving window as it depends on physical properties 
of the network. We chose the size that seemed to be the most appropriate for the 
purposes of our analysis. 
Next, we discuss the approach we have taken to integrate fine-grained 
reputation into a wireless ad hoc routing mechanism. 
3.2 Integrating Reputation into Wireless Ad Hoc Routing 
An ad hoc routing protocol can be defined as “a convention or a standard that 
control how nodes come to agree which way to route packets between computing 
devices in a mobile ad hoc network” (Lang 2008). Next, we summarize characteristics 
of wireless ad hoc routing without extensions offered by a reputation system. 
3.2.1 Wireless Ad Hoc Routing Without Reputation 
Most ad hoc routing protocols assume that the participating nodes will 
cooperate and perform their forwarding duties for other nodes. The only task such 
protocol needs to handle is maintaining connectivity among the nodes. Ad hoc routing 
protocols classified as reactive or on-demand (NetworkWorkingGroup 2007), 
(NetworkWorkingGroup 2003) find a route from a source to a destination only when it 
is needed. Typically a source node floods the network with some type of route 
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discovery control packets. Route discovery packets propagate through the network and 
accumulate addresses of each node between the source and destination. Intermediate 
nodes may take advantage of the accumulated path information and cache it for future 
use. Once the path is discovered, the source node will receive a reply packet containing 
the address of each intermediate node the packet needs to traverse (Lang 2008). 
Because the best path is determined by the routing protocol, the user has no influence 
over what path his or her data takes on the way to the destination. Routing protocols 
typically calculate the “goodness” of a path based on a cost of each individual node on 
that path. The cost of each node is assigned using some cost function. The protocols 
search for the path that has the minimum total cost, i.e. the least-cost path. The 
simplest example is the shortest-path approach, where each node has the same cost of 
one. When the routing protocol searches for a path, if will find the one that contains 
the smallest number of intermediate nodes, since its cost will be the smallest. 
If the ad hoc routing protocol does not have a mechanism to detect presence 
and activity of misbehaving nodes, the chosen path may contain selfish and/or 
malicious nodes. As a consequence, in the presence of non-cooperative nodes, the 
performance of the network will degrade, until ultimately the network is rendered 
useless. One of many examples is the experiment presented in (Buchegger 2002a), 
which shows that “the defenseless” DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) protocol loses 
about 70% of packets when the fraction of misbehaving nodes is one third of the total 
population of 50 nodes. Integrating a reputation system into a wireless ad hoc protocol 
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allows the protocol to be aware of the behavior of each node and makes the ad hoc 
network more robust in the presence of misbehaving nodes.  
3.2.2 Integrating Reputation into Wireless Ad Hoc Routing 
The advantage that a reputation system offers to a routing protocol is the ability 
to classify nodes into good and misbehaving and take appropriate actions against the 
misbehaving nodes in order to protect the security and reliability of the network. Our 
fine-grained reputation system further extends this feature by allowing the protocol to 
classify nodes in one of the three categories - friendly, selfish, or malicious, and treat 
selfish and malicious nodes separately. By definition, malicious nodes compromise the 
integrity of the data packets, thus we consider them more dangerous than selfish nodes. 
While both security and reliability of an ad hoc network are important, we think that 
the damage inflicted by a security breach is more likely to be serious and irreparable 
than a loss of data packets caused by selfish nodes. Because of this, we suggest that 
malicious nodes should be temporarily isolated by disallowing them to either send or 
forward packets. Selfish nodes, however, should not be excluded from the network in 
the same fashion as malicious, since this approach lowers the overall network 
connectivity. They should be prevented to benefit from their selfish behavior, and 
given an opportunity and incentive to improve. 
The fine-grained reputation system is a distributed reputation system, meaning 
that each node stores a reputation table representing its own view of its environment. 
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In other words, a global view of the reputation for all nodes does not exist. Our design 
is an appropriate match for the decentralized, infrastructure-less architecture of 
wireless ad hoc networks. The first and second-hand reputation mechanisms allow 
every node to obtain reputation values for nodes at most two hops away (Figure 3.2). 
 
Figure 3.2: Second-hand reputation mechanism allows node A to find out about node 
C’s behavior, even though C is not A’s neighbor. 
In a wireless routing scheme coupled with the fine-grained routing protocol, 
each node assigns cost to other nodes depending on the current total reputation values 
for those nodes. Since it is more practical to describe cost as one numerical value, we 
convert the reputation 3-tuple (<f,s,m>) into a single-valued cost using the following 
function: 
AAAAAA cmbsafmsfC ++=),,( ,  
where a, b, and c are constants such that cba <<≤1 , and >< AAA msf ,, is the total 
reputation value for node A for which holds that 1=++ AAA msf . The constants a, b, 
Node A Node B Node C
First-hand observations 
FAB 
First-hand observations 
FBC
Second-hand observations
FBC 
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and c are used to distinguish between the cost of friendly, selfish and malicious nodes. 
The constants can be adjusted in such way where nodes with a certain high probability 
of selfish behavior are considered to have the same cost as malicious nodes, or where a 
certain amount of malicious behavior is tolerable as it can be attributed to transmission 
errors. Regardless of the approach, the cost boundaries between friendly and selfish, 
and selfish and malicious nodes have to be clearly defined so that the routing protocol 
is able to distinguish among the groups. For instance, we consider selfish nodes to 
always have greater cost than the friendly nodes (regardless of how small the 
probability of selfish behavior may be), and similarly, the malicious nodes to always 
have greater cost than the selfish nodes. We express this relationship as: 
AAA cmbsaf <<≤1 . The upper bound for cmA is equal to the infinite cost indicating a 
disconnected link. This is consistent with our strategy to temporarily isolate malicious 
nodes after they reach and pass a certain malicious threshold.  
If one path in the network has a slightly better reputation than other paths, it 
will most likely be selected by multiple sources as the best path. It is possible that 
nodes on the path become overloaded by forwarding requests. These nodes will not be 
able to forward all the packets they receive and will start dropping packets, thereby 
increasing their selfish component. Eventually, the reputation of the nodes on this path 
will decrease, and a new best path will be selected. The friendly nodes which were not 
able to process packets because of their physical limitations and unrealistic 
expectations will be treated as selfish. Since the routing protocol will keep seeking the 
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least-cost path, this scenario could continue repeating indefinitely. To balance packet 
load on friendly nodes, we suggest that instead of one best path, the routing protocol 
selects two or three disjointed “best” paths, if such exist. Disjointed means they do not 
have any intermediate nodes in common. In the set of selected paths, one path will be 
the best and the inferior paths may have a greater selfish component. It is likely that 
one of the selected paths is better than the rest. However, we let the source 
occasionally, with a predetermined (lower) probability, select one of the inferior paths. 
By doing this, the selfish nodes on the path are given a chance to improve their 
behavior, and the otherwise friendly nodes on the best path will have a lower chance of 
becoming overloaded. 
As we discussed previously, the moving window mechanism allows us to 
adjust responsiveness of the fine-grained reputation system to changes in nodes’ 
behavior. The smaller the size of the moving window, the quicker is the system to 
detect misbehavior. The moving window allows us to implement a gradual redemption 
of malicious nodes once they have been isolated. If we were to allow them to quickly 
recover their reputation, malicious nodes may be tempted to misbehave again. The 
procedure is the following: once a malicious node reaches the reputation threshold for 
isolation, we set its reputation cost to infinity and forbid it from forwarding packets by 
not sending it any data. The reputation threshold is adjustable and depends on the 
tolerance the network has for malicious behavior. After a timeout ((Buchegger 2002a), 
(Rebahi 2005)), we reset the node’s reputation to just above the threshold value. In 
case the node repeats its malicious behavior, its reputation will immediately fall below 
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the threshold, and it will be isolated again. We also increase the moving window size 
used for monitoring of this node in order to increase the time needed for the node to 
recover. In Figure 3.3 we illustrate the redemption process for a malicious node that 
exhibit the same rate of change in behavior as a selfish node. The moving window size 
is 3, and the number of observed packets in each window is 50. The threshold for 
malicious behavior is m=0.7, where m is the malicious component of the reputation 
vector <f,s,m>. We illustrate the variation in the reputation through changes in the 
friendly component. Given that f+s+m=1, and s=0, it follows that f=0.3. We triple the 
size of the moving window for the purpose of the redemption of the malicious node. 
We see in Figure 3.3 that an increase in friendly behavior in both nodes after the 9th 
window. Due to the timeout, reputation for the malicious node was reset to the 
threshold value, f=0.3. Reputation for the malicious node was not reset, thus the node 
started its redemption from a lower f value. We see from the graph that in the 27th 
window, the selfish node almost redeemed its friendly reputation, f=1. In contrast, for 
the malicious node the friendly reputation was not fully regained even after 37 
windows. This is due to the fact that new reputation for the selfish node was calculated 
over the moving window size of 3, while for the malicious node it was calculated over 
the triple size of the original moving window. 
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Figure 3.3: Redemption of a malicious node reflected through the change in the 
friendly reputation component. 
In the next chapter we will describe the analysis of the performance of the fine-
grained reputation system. 
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C h a p t e r  I V  
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
In order to evaluate the benefits of the fine-grained reputation system, we 
compare it with a reputation system that is able to classify nodes only as friendly 
(good) and misbehaving (bad). We will refer to this system as to a beta reputation 
system because it assumes that the nodes’ behaviors follow the Beta distribution. We 
consider two variations of the beta reputation system: a system which classifies all 
misbehaving nodes as selfish, and a system which classifies all misbehaving nodes as 
malicious.  
We used a custom simulator developed with Adobe Flash CS3 in 
ActionScript3.0, targeted for Flash player version 9 or greater. (The simulator code is 
available upon request. Email: alma.cemerlic@gmail.com) We chose Flash because of 
its excellent graphical and interactive capabilities, support for object-oriented 
programming provided by ActionScript3.0, and platform independence and portability. 
The simulations are run on Intel Core2 Duo at 2.0GHz laptop with RAM size of 2 GB. 
The operating system is Windows Vista Ultimate SP1. 
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In our simulations, we monitor data packets exchange among nodes, and we 
are not concerned with any wireless ad hoc protocol control packets used to establish 
and maintain connectivity among nodes. We are also not concerned with any packets 
exchanged as a part of the reputation system. Data packets are sent at an average rate 
of 50 packets per second (Yuen 2008). Injected packets are assigned to a packet flow 
form a source to a destination when the flow is routed through a malicious node. We 
assume that the routing paths are provided and maintained by the underlining routing 
protocol. We also assume that the reputation information is exchanged in a correct 
manner regardless of a node’s reputation classification.  
For our simulation cases, we use a constant number of 50 nodes randomly 
placed on a 800m by 800m stage. The diameter of the maximum communication range 
for each node is 75 meters. Every node has at least one edge connecting it to the rest of 
the network. All edges are bidirectional, meaning that if nodes A and B are neighbors, 
and A is able to receive packets from node B, node A could instead send packets to 
node B. We assume that the mobility rate in the ad hoc network is low, and 
considering the duration of our simulation cases (500 seconds), we assume the nodes 
are static.  
The pattern of packet exchange among the nodes is random for each simulation 
case. The same cases are run on the fine-grained and the beta reputation systems. 
During the simulation, packets are sent from a source to a destination every second. 
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All misbehaving nodes belong to one of the two classes – they are either selfish 
or malicious. For the purpose of the simulation cases, we define selfish nodes as the 
ones that consistently drop approximately 20% of the packets they are supposed to 
forward for other nodes. We define malicious nodes as the ones that consistently inject 
10 packets per 50 forwarded packets. The total percent of misbehaving nodes varies 
from 4% to 40%. We follow the example set in (Michiardi 2002a) and limit the 
population of misbehaving nodes to 40% of the total node population. Michiardi et al. 
claim that this is in most cases unrealistically high ratio of misbehaving nodes, and 
thus we take it to be sufficient to test the performance of the reputation systems. In 
each simulation case, the ratio of selfish and malicious nodes is different, but their total 
number never exceeds 40% of the total size of the node population. We group 
simulation cases in four main sets according to the total number of misbehaving nodes: 
40%, 30%, 20% and up to 10%. We then vary the ratio of selfish and malicious nodes 
within each set as follows: 
Set 1 (40%): case (1) 4% selfish, 36% malicious, case (2) 10% selfish, 30% malicious, 
case (3) 20% selfish, 20% malicious, case (4) 30% selfish, 10% malicious, case (5) 
36% selfish, 4% malicious. 
Set 2 (30%): case (1) 4% selfish,26% malicious, case (2) 10% selfish, 20% malicious, 
case (3) 20% selfish, 10% malicious, case (4) 26% selfish, 4% malicious 
Set 3 (20%): case (1) 4% selfish, 16% malicious, case (2) 10% selfish, 10% malicious, 
case (3) 16% selfish, 4% malicious 
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Set 4 (up to 10%): case (1) 4% selfish, 6% malicious, case (2) 4% selfish, 4% 
malicious, case (3) 6% selfish, 4% malicious. 
The performance metrics used to compare the fine-grained and the beta 
reputation systems are effective throughput, connectivity, and the percentage of 
injected packets introduced in the system by malicious nodes. Effective throughput is 
used to express the fraction of total occupied bandwidth used by legitimate traffic, 
where legitimate means that the traffic was not produced as a consequence of the 
malicious activity. Connectivity is a function of the number and a cost of possible 
paths in the network connecting all available nodes capable of forwarding packets. We 
use this metric to distinguish the fine-grained reputation system from the beta system 
which treats all misbehaving nodes as malicious and reacts to misbehavior by 
disconnecting the nodes from the network. The percentage of injected packets to total 
number of packets instantiated in the network is used to evaluate the opportunity given 
to the malicious nodes to affect the network traffic. This metric is used to compare the 
fine-grained reputation system with the beta system which treats all misbehaving 
nodes as selfish and assigns their cost with respect to the probability of misbehavior.  
4.2 Simulation Results 
The following is a comparison of the fine-grained reputation system and a 
reputation system able to classify behavior of ad hoc nodes only as friendly (good) or 
misbehaving (bad). We consider two variations of the beta system – the one that treats 
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all nodes as malicious and the other that treats all nodes as selfish. The reputation 
systems are compared using the following metrics: effective throughput, connectivity, 
and the percentage of injected packets introduced in the network by malicious nodes. 
4.2.1 Effective Throughput 
Figure 4.1 compares the effective throughput for the fine-grained and the beta 
reputation systems across the simulation cases. From the figure, it is possible to see 
that the fine-grained reputation system has overall higher effective throughput than 
either of the beta reputation system variations. 
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Figure 4.1: Effective throughput - comparison for the fine-grained <f,s,m> and beta 
<g,b> reputation systems. 
Since in the beta reputation systems both selfish and malicious behavior are 
considered to have equal cost, the beta reputation systems are likely to make a mistake 
and choose malicious over selfish nodes when estimating a path cost. Such false 
decisions will compromise the security of the network, which we always consider to 
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be more costly than a possibility of packet loss. In general, we can say that we expect a 
better effective throughput from the fine-grained reputation system than the beta 
reputation systems that treat all misbehaving nodes as either selfish or malicious. This 
is especially true in the presence of a larger number of malicious nodes. 
4.2.2 Percentage of Injected Packets 
Next, we examine the percent of injected packets that traversed the network 
during the simulation. Injected packets are introduced in the network as a result of 
malicious activity. By our definition, when a legitimate traffic is routed through a 
malicious node, the node will inject 10 packets per every 50 packets it forwards. These 
packets are assigned to the legitimate packet stream and travel to the destination. 
Figure 4.2 shows a graphical comparison of the fine-grained reputation system and the 
two beta systems. The numbers are consistent with the previous comparison of the 
effective throughput. We observe that the percent of injected packets is lower for the 
fine-grained reputation system than for either of the beta reputation systems. 
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of injected packets - comparison for the fine-grained <f,s,m> 
and beta <g,b> reputation systems. 
We attribute the results of the comparison for both, the effective throughput 
and the percentage of injected packets, to the fact that the beta reputation systems are 
not able to make distinction between the two classes of misbehaving nodes – selfish 
and malicious. In the fine-grained reputation system, malicious nodes are always 
assigned higher cost than selfish nodes. This means that a very low probability of 
malicious behavior is always more costly than a very high probability of selfish 
behavior. In the beta reputation system, the cost of nodes depends on their relative 
probability of misbehaving, regardless of whether the nature of misbehavior is selfish 
or malicious. In case that a malicious node has a lower probability of misbehavior than 
a selfish node, the beta reputation system will assign a lower cost to the path 
containing that malicious node than to the one containing the selfish node. In the fine-
grained reputation system this could not happen, as there is a clear distinction between 
selfish and malicious behavior.  
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4.2.3 Effective Throughput and Percentage of Injected Packets with Moving 
Window Mechanism 
We now show how the moving window mechanism influences the 
performance of the fine-grained reputation system. The moving window mechanism 
reacts to a node’s misbehavior by tripling the size of the observation window once the 
node’s malicious behavior reached a threshold. We did not attempt to optimize this 
threshold. The size of the observation window is increased only in the positive 
direction – if the node’s behavior improves, it will take a greater number of 
observations to reflect this improvement. However, if the node continues to behave 
maliciously, the observation window will still be equivalent to the original window 
size, and the misbehavior will be detected faster. 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 present a comparison of the effective throughput and the 
percent of the injected packets for the fine-grained reputation system with and without 
the moving window, and the two beta reputation systems. Nodes are 20% 
misbehaving, meaning that they will drop or maliciously manipulate 20% of the 
packets they handle. We see no difference between the performances of the fine-
grained reputation system with and without the moving window mechanism.  
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Figure 4.3: Effective throughput - comparison for the fine-grained <f,s,m> reputation 
system with and without the moving window mechanism and beta <g,b> reputation 
systems with 20% node misbehavior. 
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Figure 4.4: Percentage of injected packets - comparison for the fine-grained <f,s,m> 
reputation system with and without the moving window mechanism and beta <g,b> 
reputation systems with 20% node misbehavior. 
In figures 4.5 and 4.6, we increased the nodes’ misbehavior to 80%. We noted 
a much bigger improvement in performance of the fine-grained reputation system with 
the moving window mechanism when compared to the fine-grainer reputation system 
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without it. We conclude that this difference is due to the misbehavior threshold used to 
engage the moving window mechanism. Thus, the moving window mechanism 
contributes to the effectiveness of the fine-grained system, since the threshold can be 
fine-tuned to be more responsive to changes in nodes’ behavior. 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Simulation case
Ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
th
ro
ug
hp
ut
<f,s,m> moving window
<f,s,m>
<g,b> malicious
<g,b> selfish
<f,s,m> moving window 0.8748 0.8412 0.8816 0.9776 0.997 0.9264 0.9693 0.9898 0.9973
<f,s,m> 0.6259 0.5396 0.6088 0.9178 0.9881 0.7518 0.88 0.9603 0.9891
<g,b> malicious 0.5684 0.4598 0.4464 0.6186 0.9635 0.6825 0.7072 0.7796 0.9721
<g,b> selfish 0.588 0.5323 0.5253 0.5764 0.9286 0.6845 0.7158 0.8517 0.9776
4% 
36%
10% 
30%
20% 
20%
30% 
10%
36% 
4%
4% 
26%
10% 
20%
20% 
10%
26% 
4%
NODES:
% self ish
%malicious
Figure 4.5: Effective throughput - comparison for the fine-grained <f,s,m> reputation 
system with and without the moving window mechanism and beta <g,b> reputation 
systems with 80% node misbehavior. 
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Figure 4.6: Percentage of injected packets - comparison for the fine-grained <f,s,m> 
reputation system with and without the moving window mechanism and beta <g,b> 
reputation systems with 80% node misbehavior. 
4.2.4 Connectivity 
To protect the network from the malicious nodes, a common approach 
reputation systems take is to temporarily isolate or disconnect these nodes. The beta 
reputation system, which classifies all the misbehaving nodes in one category and 
treats them as malicious, will lower the overall connectivity of the network if it 
chooses to isolate every misbehaving node for which the probability of misbehavior 
exceeds a certain threshold. The beta reputation system which classifies all the 
misbehaving nodes as selfish will show a higher overall connectivity, but also a higher 
percent of injected packets.  
In order to compare the fine-grained and the beta reputation systems, we 
calculate total connectivity for each system. The calculation is performed after the 
 60 
same time interval for all simulation cases. Total connectivity is calculated according 
to the formula:  
∑ ∑= == nA nB
AB
N S
C
0 0
1 , 
where CN is the total connectivity of a network at some point in time, n is the number 
of nodes in the network, and SAB is the reputation cost of reaching node B from node A 
as observed on node A and given that A and B are neighbors. If node A and B are not 
neighbors, then the cost is infinite and the connectivity between them is zero. A higher 
total connectivity value indicates that the overall reputation cost is lower. Figure 4.7 
illustrates the difference in connectivity values among the cases in the 40% simulation 
set. 
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Figure 4.7: Total connectivity of the network - comparison for the fine-grained <f,s,m> 
and beta <g,b> reputation systems over the cases in the 40% simulation set. 
As defined earlier, the reputation value in the fine-grained reputation system is 
calculated as a vector <f, s, m> where f corresponds to the friendly component, s to the 
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selfish, and m to the malicious and f+s+m = 1. The beta reputation system only has 
two components, <g, b>, where b = s+m, and g+b = 1.  
In the fine-grained reputation system, the cost of reaching a selfish node 
is 21 ≤< c , and the cost of reaching a malicious node is 102101 ≤< c . The cost c is 
calculated as 1+s for the selfish behavior, and 101+m for the malicious. In the beta 
reputation system which considers all misbehaving nodes as malicious, the cost to all 
misbehaving nodes is 102101 ≤< c , and c is calculated as 101+b. Conversely, in the 
beta reputation system which considers all misbehaving nodes as selfish, the cost to all 
misbehaving nodes is 21 ≤< c , and c is calculated as 1+b 
Suppose that the entire misbehaving population of the network consists of 
selfish nodes. Suppose also that the misbehaving threshold for isolating a node from 
the network is set to m=0.2, or equivalently in the beta system that treats all 
misbehaving nodes as malicious to b=0.2. This corresponds to cost c=101.2 in both 
systems. Given that there exists a selfish node for which 2.0≥s , this node will not be 
isolated in the fine-grained reputation system as its cost is determined to be 22.1 ≤≤ c . 
In the beta reputation system the cost for the same node will be 1022.101 ≤≤ c , and 
therefore the node will be punished and isolated. From this example if follows that we 
can generally expect the beta reputation system that treats all misbehaving nodes as 
malicious to have lower network connectivity than the fine-grained reputation system 
given that selfish nodes are present in the network, and that their cost exceeds the 
isolation threshold 
 62 
4.2.5 Discussion of Results 
Overall, the simulation results support our claim that the fine-grained 
reputation system is more effective than either of the two variations of the beta 
reputation system. When compared to the beta system which treats all misbehaving 
nodes as selfish, the fine-grained reputation system lowers the number of injected 
packets in the system, or more generally, lowers the activity of malicious nodes. When 
compared to the beta system which treats all misbehaving nodes as malicious, the fine-
grained system results in higher network connectivity because it does not use the same 
strategy for both selfish and malicious nodes. 
In the presented simulation cases, selfish and malicious nodes correspondingly 
drop or inject approximately 20% packets for every 50 packets they forward. The 
nodes only misbehave when they are a part of a packet route in use. The data exchange 
pattern among nodes is random, thus it is not guaranteed that all sender-receiver 
combinations are going to be repeated or even used.  
 Under these conditions, we observed the following improvements: over all 
simulation cases the average percent increase in the effective throughput for the fine-
grained reputation system was 2.84% when compared to the beta reputation system 
that treats all nodes as malicious, and 2.5% when compared to the beta reputation 
system that treats all nodes as selfish; the average percent decrease in the number of 
injected packets was 2.76% when compared to the beta system that treats all nodes as 
malicious and 2.49% when compared to the beta system that treats all nodes as selfish. 
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Over the simulation set that contained 40% of misbehaving nodes, the fine-grained 
reputation system showed an average percent increase in connectivity of 9.55% when 
compared the beta reputation system that treats all nodes as malicious. When we 
compared the fine-grained system with the beta system that treats all nodes as selfish, 
we observed an increase in connectivity of 10.56% for the beta system. However, the 
tradeoff was an average of 4.69% more injected packets and 4.64% decrease in the 
effective throughput of the beta system. 
Without a physical implementation or a simulation that accounts for physical 
aspects of the environment and each ad hoc node, it is not possible to evaluate 
overhead introduced by the addition of the fine-grained reputation system on an 
existing ad hoc routing protocol. We define the reputation system overhead as the 
following: control packets required by the reputation system, memory for storage of 
the reputation data, CPU time required for reputation related tasks (calculations and 
monitoring), and battery power required for promiscuous mode operation and 
dissemination of the reputation information among neighbors. The overhead also 
depends highly on the underlying routing protocol. 
Although we currently do not have an adequate mechanism to evaluate the 
fine-grained reputation system overhead, the existing beta-reputation systems’ 
implementations and performance analysis can be used to derive an estimated 
overhead. When compared to the beta systems, the fine-grained reputation system 
introduces one additional variable, namely the third reputation vector component. 
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Thusly we would expect a minimal increase in computational and memory 
requirements. Pirzada et al. offer a detailed performance analysis of a beta reputation 
system implemented on three wireless ad hoc routing protocols, TORA, AODV, and 
DSR. A detailed discussion of the results presented in (Pirzada 2006) is beyond the 
scope of this work. Pirzada et al. support our statement that the performance of the 
fine-grained reputation system will very much depend on the underlying routing 
protocol – greater routing overhead introduced by the protocol itself causes greater 
overall overhead. This inevitably leads to packet collisions, packet loss, and decrease 
in the quality of service. Intuitively from (Pirzada 2006), it follows that greater overall 
mobility of the network will require more power for route discovery. Additionally, a 
network with higher mobility will require more frequent distribution of reputation 
information - in order for nodes to adapt they need to receive reputation information 
from newly discovered neighbors. Since the overhead metrics depend on the 
implementation of the fine-grained reputation system itself, and the properties of any 
given ad hoc network, we suggest a detailed overhead analysis of the fine-grained 
reputation system as future work. 
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C h a p t e r  V  
CONCLUSION 
Most wireless ad hoc routing protocols assume cooperation among the ad hoc 
nodes. However, in reality, there is no guarantee that ad hoc nodes will behave in non-
malicious and cooperative way. Various types of reputation systems have emerged in 
recent years as an attempt to address security and reliability of wireless ad hoc 
networks. We propose a fine-grained reputation system to address the problem of node 
misbehavior. Our solution makes distinction between selfish and malicious 
misbehavior, as opposed to reputation systems that are only able to classify nodes as 
good and misbehaving (bad). Our reputation system integrates the Dirichlet 
distribution with Bayes’ theorem, which allows for finer granularity of node 
classification and updating of the reputation based on new knowledge. Our system is 
distributed and collaborative in a sense that nodes acquire new knowledge through 
first-hand observations of their neighbors’ behavior, and through the reports they 
receive from other nodes containing their first-hand observations. The fine-grained 
reputation system includes a trust component based on the Beta distribution in order to 
be able to prevent nodes from spreading false reputation information.  
Whereas systems that classify nodes in good and bad treat all misbehaving 
nodes in the same way, we propose different strategies for different classes of 
misbehavior: we do not forward data packets for selfish nodes until they improve their 
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behavior, and we temporarily isolate malicious nodes and make their reputation 
redemption slower than in the case of selfish nodes. We show that our system is able to 
improve network connectivity and decrease the number of maliciously modified or 
injected packets in the network when compared to the beta reputation systems. 
For future work, one of the biggest issues in reputation systems is node 
identity. An identity mechanism for ad hoc networks has to be resistant to identity 
spoofing attacks and needs to support identity persistence over some time (Buchegger 
2008). We think that investigating a real incentive scheme for selfish nodes in the fine-
grained reputation system could contribute to even better performance of the system. 
Incorporating the fine-grained reputation system with a routing ad hoc protocol such as 
DSR in an effective and efficient way would allow us to test the system in reality and 
to be able to tell what kind of performance tradeoff our system requires in exchange 
for providing security and reliability to the ad hoc network. 
(Neapolitan 2003), (Buchegger S. 2004), (Yang 2008), (Broch 1998), (Cahill 
2003), (Dimmock 2004), (Sterbenz 2002), (Bechler 2004), (Ngai 2004), (Cormen 
2001; Hu 2002; Jaramillo 2007), (Marti 2006), (Yang 2007), (Cemerlic 2006; Josang 
2007) 
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